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                                                                    Abstract  
This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model with learning by 
doing effect in unskilled work. We study the short run equilibrium of schooling, relationship 
between child schooling and parental schooling, long run dynamics of schooling and human 
capital and relative effectiveness of two domestic policies- child labour ban and education 
subsidy on schooling. We find some interesting results. If parents working in unskilled sector 
do not experience any schooling at their childhood, they will never send their children for 
schooling. But the relationship between parental schooling and child schooling may not be 
monotonic. This relationship depends on other factors like subsistence consumption 
expenditure, learning by doing effect, responsiveness of wage to human capital in skilled 
sector, efficiency of education technology. Existence of low level equilibrium trap for 
unskilled parent depends on the specific form of human capital accumulation function. For a 
certain range of parental schooling time path of child schooling will be oscillating in nature. 
Decrease in child wage increases steady state schooling only if the maximum possible adult 
unskilled wage exceeds the sum of the schooling cost and subsistence expenditure of the 
household. If unskilled adult wage is sufficiently small, education subsidy is more effective in 
enhancing schooling than banning child labour.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Child labour is a persistent problem across the globe, especially in the developing countries. 
A number of rules and conventions have been laid down all over the world to fight child 
labour. This paper builds a theoretical model to examine the relative effectiveness of two 
types of domestic policies to combat child labour-a child labour ban and an education 
subsidy. In spite of steady decline in the incidence of child labour over the last decade, ILO 
estimates show that the number of child workers across the globe is still quite high. 
According to the ILO estimates, in 2012, there were about 168 million child labourers in the 
world, of whom more than two thirds (120 million) were in the age group 5 to 14 years old. 
In 2012, the largest number of child labourers was in Asia and the Pacific (77.7 million), 
followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 59.0 million, Latin America and the Caribbean with 
12.5 million and Middle East and North Africa with 9.2 million. In relative terms, Sub-
Saharan Africa ranks highest. About 1 in 5 children was in child labour in the region. 
 
These figures point out that tackling the problem of child labour still remains a challenging 
issue for the developing countries across the world. Both domestic as well as international 
policies may be undertaken to reduce the incidence of child labour. However in this paper we 
restrict our analysis only to domestic policies. A number of theoretical papers deal with the 
effectiveness of domestic policies to reduce child labour. The pioneer work on child labour 
by Basu and Van (1998) shows that in case of multiple equilibria in the labour market, a total 
ban on child labour can take the economy from bad equilibrium to good equilibrium. All 
working class households will be better off. But if there is only one equilibrium, a total ban 
could harm worker households and also benefit them. A partial ban may not always reduce 
child labour but may reduce only child wage. However utility of the worker household may 
or may not increase. According to Baland and Robinson (2000) small ban on child labour can 
be Pareto improving. A ban on child labour reduces the supply of child labour while 
increasing the supply of adult labour in the future. As a result, current wages of both adults 
and children are likely to rise and future wages are likely to fall. Thus while children’s utility 
is likely to rise in most cases, parental welfare will increase only when the effect on current 
wages dominates. The paper by Dessy and Pallage (2001) states that compulsory bans on 
child labour help sending signals to investors that investment in human capital will be made 
in the near future and thus skilled labour is likely to be available. Ban or compulsory 
education will be counterproductive if the cost of investment is very high. Instead a policy 
that subsidizes technology and imposes compulsory education can help to move the economy 
from bad equilibrium to a good one. Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007), in their paper on 
globalisation, show that a ban on child labours benefits adult unskilled workers but hurts 
adult skilled workers. According to Emerson and Knabb (2006), P.Ranjan (1999, 2001) 
banning child labour can reduce dynastic welfare, increase poverty and further accentuate 
income inequality within society. Few papers deal with the policy issues on harmful forms of 
child labour. According to Rogers and Swinnerton (2002), a ban on exploitative child labour 
has ambiguous effects i.e. child employment and aggregate output may rise or fall. Dessy and 
Pallage (2005) states that a ban on worst forms of child labour in poor countries is likely to be 
welfare reducing as these forms of labour have important economic role to play. The wages 
earned by the children by working in these jobs help in human capital accumulation. So by 
denying them work, they are being relegated to an even worse situation. 
 
There is a small set of literature that deals with the effect of education policy on child labour. 
Emerson and Knabb (2006) show that compulsory education policy may actually reduce 
welfare. According to Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2003), a rise in the education subsidy 
may produce counterproductive results on the supply of child labour in the urban area. 
Moreover it may raise the level of urban unemployment of adults even when adult labour and 
child labour are not substitutes to each other. The average income of the urban poor families 
may also decrease as a consequence. Chaudhuri (2004) states that the effects of increase in 
education subsidy on child labour depends on relative strength of two effects-namely labour 
re-allocation effect and the contradictory effect which exerts a downward pressure on the 
incidence of child labour. Mukherjee and Sinha (2006) and Estevez (2011) argue in favour of 
education subsidy in improving school attendance. According to Estevez (2011), an 
education subsidy will reduce the incidence of child labour, increase the household income 
and will also indirectly increase the unskilled wage. 
 
Some empirical papers on domestic policies on child labour deserve mention as well. Fabre 
and Pallage (2011) works within a dynamic, general equilibrium model calibrated to South 
Africa in the 1990s. It shows that in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to adult 
employment, child labour ban deprives the households of an important way of smoothing 
consumption. Schultz (2004) evaluates the performance of Progresa (provides education 
grants to poor mothers) program in rural Mexico and has concluded that there has been 
significant reduction in child work for those families who have been induced by the program 
to enrol their child in school. However the magnitude of the response cannot offset more than 
a fifth of the total consumption gains associated with the program grants. The paper by 
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) studies the effects of a targeted enrolment subsidy on children’s 
labour force participation and school enrolment in rural Bangladesh. Results suggest that the 
enrolment subsidy reduced the incidence of child labour but this effect accounts for a small 
proportion of the increase in school enrolment. So reduction of child labour not necessarily 
implies increase in schooling. Krueger and Donohue (2005) calibrate their model to USA 
data around 1880 and conclude that introducing free education results in substantial welfare 
gains, whereas a child labour ban induces small welfare losses. 
 
None of the papers mentioned so far have theoretically examined the effects of ban and 
education subsidy on steady state schooling and steady state human capital of the child labour 
in the presence of learning by doing effect in unskilled sector. Learning by doing effect is 
included in unskilled wages in our paper. Dessy and Pallage (2005), in their paper on worst 
forms of child labour, consider the learning by doing effect in the human capital 
accumulation function. There are many other papers which emphasize on the learning by 
doing effect. However these papers do not deal with the issue of child labour. Arrow (1962), 
Mao (2012), Parente (1994), Hippel and Tyre (1993) deal with learning by doing effect but in 
different context. In our paper individuals earn an extra income as adult in the unskilled 
sector if they have work experience as child labour in their young age. This is how learning 
by doing effect enters into our model. Learning by doing often occurs through apprenticeship 
and real life apprenticeship is found mostly in informal or unskilled sector e.g in fishing, 
poultry, farming etc. According to World Employment Report 1998-99-“In Kenya, with its 
relatively well developed formal training system, there are more apprentices enrolled in the 
informal sector than trainees in the formal sector”, while “in Egypt, over 80% of craftsmen in 
the construction sector acquire their skills through traditional apprenticeship.” According to 
the report, child labour is common in the field of apprenticeship. According to ILO’s report 
on Employment Sector (2008), apprenticeship has been providing the traditional solution for 
developing and financing vocational skills of young people in poor societies. Estimations 
suggest that 80% of the skills imparted in the informal economy in West Africa are 
transferred through apprenticeship. In Benin, in 2005, approximately 2000,000 young 
apprentices were trained, which represents ten times as many apprentices than students in 
vocational and technical education. The present paper includes learning by doing effect in 
wages of unskilled labour and makes a comparison between the effect of child labour ban and 
education subsidy on child labour. 
 
The present paper builds an overlapping generations model of household economy consisting 
of a skilled sector and an unskilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she 
gets wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return and a 
positive learning by doing effect generated from working in her childhood. Human capital 
formation of child is included in the parental utility function and parental choice of schooling 
vis-a-vis child work is considered. More educated parent gives more stress on human capital 
accumulation of the child in his utility function. This paper attempts to understand the effects 
of child labour ban and education subsidy on steady state schooling and steady state human 
capital of child labour. Moreover this paper studies the relative effectiveness of child labour 
ban and education subsidy in improving schooling of the child. 
 
In case of unskilled parent we find in this model that if parents are completely uneducated, 
they will not send their children for schooling. We also find that there exist two steady state 
equilibria of schooling in the presence of intercept term in human capital accumulation 
function. The low level equilibrium represents a trap1. Once the trap is crossed schooling 
keeps on increasing and the time path of schooling is convergent towards higher of the 
equilibrium. Once the higher of the steady state level of parental human capital is crossed 
time path of schooling becomes convergent but oscillating in nature 2 . However if the 
intercept term is absent in human capital accumulation function the low level equilibrium trap 
does not exist anymore. There is only one equilibrium. The time path of schooling of the 
child is steadily convergent in nature when approached from below steady state level of 
parental schooling and beyond the steady state value of schooling the time path of schooling 
is convergent but oscillating in nature. 
 
In the presence of intercept term in human capital accumulation function we find that for 
skilled parent, one steady state equilibrium prevails which is unstable in nature. Below the 
steady state, schooling keeps on falling till it converges to zero and beyond the steady state; 
schooling keeps on rising till it converges to full schooling. In case where the intercept term 
is absent in human capital accumulation function, if skilled parents also send their children 
for partial schooling then there exists a critical level of parental schooling beyond which 
steady growth of schooling of child takes place and eventually it converges towards full 
schooling. However below that critical level, schooling of child keeps on falling till it 
converges to the unskilled level steady state schooling in an oscillating manner. But if 
schooling required to be engaged as skilled worker is higher than the critical level of parental 
schooling beyond which they send their children for full schooling then there exists only one 
steady state equilibrium in case of skilled parent and that is full schooling. 
 
                                                           
1
 Papers dealing with child labour trap include Basu and Van (1998), Emerson and Knabb (2007), Gupta (2001), Emerson 
and Souza (2003), Basu (1999), Sarkar and Sarkar (2012), Sasmal and Guillen (2011) and others. 
 
2
 Oscillations in human capital accumulations are found in Zhang (2015), Zhang (2014), Croix and Licandro (1999), 
Croix (2001) but in different context. 
We also find that if human capital accumulation depends only on schooling of the child, then 
in case of unskilled parent, as child wage falls, steady state schooling increases only if the 
maximum unskilled adult wage exceeds the sum of subsistence consumption expenditure and 
schooling cost of the household. A fall in schooling cost increases the steady state schooling 
and steady state human capital. Comparing the effects of ban and education subsidy on steady 
state human capital in case of unskilled parent, we get the result that if unskilled adult wage is 
sufficiently small compared to subsistence consumption expenditure of the household the 
effect of giving education subsidy is more effective in enhancing schooling than banning 
child labour. We try to capture the real life problem of child labour as much as we can in this 
model. In reality a poor parent of developing country often ponders over the issue that 
whether my child would be benefitted from learning by doing effect earned because of work 
experience as child labour or they would be benefitted more if they go to school. Moreover 
we also observe that educated parents derive more satisfaction by sending their children to 
school. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 
describes the short run equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the long run dynamics. In section 5 
we consider the case where human capital formation of child depends entirely on her 
schooling and the child does not accumulate any human capital in absence of schooling. 
Concluding remarks are made in section 6. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider an economy that consists of identical households in overlapping generations 
framework3. Each household consists of one adult and one child. We consider two parents as 
one adult and two children as one child. The economy consists of two sectors- a skilled sector 
and an unskilled sector. In first period agents are children. They may either work in unskilled 
sector or go to school. In second period, the agent on reaching adulthood may either work in 
unskilled sector or in the skilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she 
gets wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return and 
learning by doing effect. The adult or the parent decides the time allocation of her child 
between work and schooling. Utility function of the adult depends on family consumption 
and human capital formation of the child. More educated parents have more preference 
towards child’s human capital. 
 
Following Glomm (1997), we assume parental choice of human capital investment. The adult 
decides how much time her child would devote to work in the unskilled sector and how much 
time for schooling by maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint. In first period, time 
devoted to schooling is denoted by ‘st-1’ and that to work is ‘1- st-1’. Working generates 
positive learning by doing effects denoted by ‘(1- st-1)h’which helps him to earn a higher 
wage in future on joining the unskilled sector.
 
In second period the adult sends her child to 
school for ‘st’ units of time and for the remaining ‘(1-st)’ units of time, the child is employed 
in the unskilled sector. Wages earned by the adult and by the child constitute the total income 
of the household. If the child joins the skilled sector, on becoming adult, she gets a wage in 
the skilled sector which is a fixed proportion of the human capital possessed by her (δht)4. In 
                                                           
3 Overlapping generations framework has been adopted by Becker and Tomes (1979), Acemoglu and Pischke (2000), 
Glomm (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and many more. 
 
4
 Hare and Ulph (1979) assume that wage rate depends on ability and amount of education received by an individual. 
 
unskilled sector the adult gets a return ‘A+ (1- st-1)h’ where‘(1- st-1)h ’ denotes positive 
learning by doing effect generated from working as a child and ‘A’ denotes the fixed return. 
 
A child, by working in the unskilled sector gets a fixed return which is less than the return 
obtained by the adults from unskilled sector. 
 
Like Moav (2005), this paper assumes that human capital evolution is independent of 
physical capital. Human capital accumulation function of a child is assumed to take the 
following form5: 
ht+1 = bst + h                                                                                                                        (1) 
where ‘st’ is the time devoted to studies by the child, b>0 is a positive constant representing 
education technology and h represents minimum level of human capital possessed by the 
child even if she does not attend school. 
In case of unskilled parent household income is given by: 
Yt = [A+ (1- st-1)h ] + Aφ (1-st ) ,                                                                                          (2) 
where Yt is total income of the household, A is wage earned by the adult in unskilled sector, 
(1- st-1)h is the positive learning by doing effect that an adult receives if she has work 
experience as child labour, φ is the fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives. Here 
0<φ<1 is a positive constant. 
The household spends its income on purchasing consumption good and schooling of the 
child. So, the budget constraint of the household is given by: 
 [A+ (1- st-1)h ]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,                                                                                (3)  
where pc is the price of the consumption good, pcct represents the total consumption 
expenditure and ρ st denotes the expenditure on schooling of the child. When adults work in 
skilled sector, household income is given by: 
Yt = wt + Aφ (1-st ) ,                                                                                                         
where wt is the wage earned by the adult in the skilled sector. We assume wage earned in 
skilled sector (wt) is proportional to the human capital acquired by that individual i.e. wt= δht. 
Utility function of an adult of the representative household is defined as follows: 
 Ut = ln (ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst +h	)     if ct ≥c  
      = -∞ otherwise                   (4) 
where ct represents consumption,	c represents subsistence consumption. The utility function is 
defined on the range ct ≥c. Utility depends on consumption of the adult and human capital 
formation of the child. Higher is the education level of the parent, more is the importance 
they give to human capital accumulation of the child. 
 
Let us first apply the model in the short run equilibrium context and understand the 
relationship between parental human capital and schooling of the child. 
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 Inclusion of parental human capital in human capital accumulation of child yields nonlinear equations and makes the 
model very complicated. So, for the sake of simplicity the human capital accumulation of child is assumed to take this form.  
3. Short-run Equilibrium  
 
3.1 Parents working in unskilled sector 
 
Utility maximization problem of an adult of the representative household working in 
unskilled sector is to maximize the utility, given by equation (4) subject to the budget 
constraint given by equation (3) with respect to the decision variables of the household viz, ct 
and st 
 
From the first order conditions6of the optimization problem, if there exists an interior solution 
of st , we obtain: 
st =   
	
					
	                                                                                                                         (5)  
st >0 if -bhs + bs{A(1+φ)+	h-pc}- h 	Aφ + ρ >0.  
This implies that if A(1+φ)+	h-pc >0, then only we get (2 positive values of s for which) 
st >0. So it is a necessary condition for st being positive.  
Note that if st-1=0 then st=0 because dz/dst<0. So we arrive at the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: If parents do not experience any schooling at their childhood they will never 
send their children for schooling. 
 
There exists a range of st-1 for which st >0.   
st = 1 if -bhs + bs[A+	h-pc-ρ] - 	Aφ + ρ(b+h	)≥0 
This implies that if A+	h-pc-ρ>0, then only we get (2 positive values of s for which) st = 
1. There also exists a range of st-1 for which st >0. 
 
Proposition 2: There exists a particular range of parental schooling for which child schooling 
is positive and a particular range of parental schooling for which child experiences full 
schooling. 
 
Differentiating st with respect to s we get 
 
"
"	 = 

			#[-bhs - 2bsh + b {A (1+φ + h-pc}+	h 	Aφ + ρ] 
"
"	 >0 if [-bhs - 2bsh + b {A (1+φ + h-pc}+h		Aφ + ρ]>0 
or s < ± &'	()* + *')(+,* + 2 − .* 	 -1=N 
We ignore the negative term since s cannot be negative. 
"#
"	#  = 
[	#	{	# 					{	}		}]	
		1	  
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 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) of Appendix A. 
 
"#
"	#  <0 if 	−bhs − 	2bsh	+ 	b	{A	1 + φ + h − pc} +	h 	Aφ + ρ} +bh1 + s>0 
or b{A(1+φ) + 2h - pc} + h 	Aφ + ρ >0 
"#
"	#  >0 if b {A (1+φ) + 2h - pc} + h 	Aφ + ρ <0 
We assume b {A (1+φ) + 2h - pc} + h 	Aφ + ρ >0 otherwise &'	()* + *')(+,* + 2 − .* 	 
becomes an imaginary number. 
If N≥1, s is always less than N. This implies that when N≥1 ""	 >0 always. 
Now N≥1 implies   + 
*')(+
,*  ≥ 2. 
Sufficient condition for this to hold is that A1 + φ − pc >0, A (1+φ) must be high and h 
must be low. 
 
Proposition 3: Parents being employed in unskilled sector, if total earnings of the household 
exceed the subsistence consumption expenditure of the household and are high and learning 
by doing effect in unskilled sector is low then schooling of child always increases with 
increase in schooling of the parent. 
 
If N<0, then this condition is never satisfied. Equilibrium does not exist. 
Therefore if N is a fraction, then  ""	 >0 till N is reached and thereafter 
"
"	 <0. 
N is a fraction when 0<N<1. This implies -1<
{}
  + 

  <2. 
If A1 + φ > pc  but A (1+φ) is low and h  is high then this inequality is likely to be 
satisfied. However this is only the sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold true. 
 
"#
"	#  <0 throughout. 
 
Proposition 4: Parents being employed as an unskilled labour, if total earnings of the 
household exceed subsistence consumption expenditure but are low and learning by doing 
effect is high, then below a particular level of parental schooling there is positive relationship 
between parental schooling and schooling of the child. But beyond a certain level of parental 
schooling, schooling of the child decreases with increase in parental level of schooling. 
 
The reason behind obtaining such result is when in spite of going to a school for quite long 
time parents are still working in unskilled sector they lack motivation to send their children to 
school. Moreover as unskilled parents went to school themselves they are losing a part of 
income that they would have earned had they have not gone to school in their childhood 
Below a particular level of parental schooling, parental schooling and child schooling are 
positively related because it is assumed that more educated parents derive more satisfaction 
from sending their children to school. But given low levels of earnings of the household and 
high learning by doing effect in unskilled sector, beyond a particular level of parental 
schooling there is a negative relationship between parental level of schooling and child 
schooling. 
 
 
3.2 Parents working in skilled sector 
 
When parents work in the skilled sector, the incentive compatibility condition requires that 
wage earned in skilled sector is higher than the wage earned in unskilled sector. This implies 
that 
w  > A+ (1- st)h which implies that δbs+h	> A+ (1- st)h i.e. st > 66  = s. This 
implies that only if st >s, then only individuals join the skilled sector. 
 
When adults work in skilled sector the budget constraint of the household is given by: 
 δ bst-1+ δh + Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st where δ bst-1+ δh denotes income of the adult working in 
the skilled sector. 
In this case schooling of the child is given by 
st   =     
	76	6	8		
	  
st >0 if δbs  + bs(δ h + 	φA − pc )	− h 	Aφ + ρ >0 . This implies that we get one 
positive value of s above which st >0 whatever be the sign of	δ h + 	φA − pc .  
st = 1 if δbs + b[δ h−pc	-ρ] s- 	Aφ + ρb + h		 ≥ 0 
This implies that there exists a positive value of s say s9 for which st = 1 whatever be the 
sign of δh−pc	-ρ.  
If s> s9  then all parents who are employed in skilled sector send their children for full 
schooling. 
 
Differentiating st with respect to s we get 
 
"
"	 = 

			#[δbs + 	2δbs +	δb h+ bAφ-bpc+	h 	Aφ + ρ] 
"
"	 >0 if δbs + 	2δbs +	δb h+ bAφ-bpc+	h 	Aφ + ρ>0 
or s > ± &.:, *,	'):, − *')(+:,# + 1 −	 -1=R 
If R≤ 0, this condition is always satisfied. So for R≤ 0, ""	 > 0 always. 
Now R≤ 0 implies .:, − {	6
	
6# } ≤ 0. 
This implies that if pc is low and δ and b are high, then in case of skilled parent, schooling 
of child will increase with increase in schooling of parent. 
 
Proposition 5: Parents being employed in skilled sector, if subsistence consumption 
expenditure of the household is low and responsiveness of wage to human capital in skilled 
sector is high and education technology is highly efficient then schooling of child always 
increases with increase in schooling of the parent. 
 
If R ≥ 1, this condition is never satisfied. So for R ≥ 1, ""	 ≤0 always. Hence there does not 
exist any equilibrium (see Figure 2). 
If 0<R<1, then s is falling till R is reached and beyond R, s is rising. 
R is a fraction when 0<R<1. This implies 0<.:, 
*
,	'):, − *')(+:,#  <3. 
If pc is sufficiently high and δ and b are low then this condition is likely to be satisfied. 
 
Proposition 6: Parents being employed as a skilled labour, if subsistence consumption 
expenditure is sufficiently high and responsiveness of wage to human capital is low and 
education technology is less efficient, then below a particular level of parental schooling 
there is negative relationship between parental schooling and schooling of the child. But 
beyond a certain level of parental schooling, schooling of the child increases with increase in 
parental level of schooling. 
 
The reason for this is that since subsistence expenditure of the household is quite high and 
responsiveness of wage to human capital for skilled parent is low and also education 
technology is not very efficient, till a particular level of parental schooling is reached 
schooling of child does not increase with increase in schooling of the parent. More educated 
parents give more importance to human capital formation of the child and hence to schooling 
of the child. So beyond a particular level of human capital only schooling of child increases 
with increase in schooling of the parent. Beyond this level high subsistence expenditure, low 
responsiveness of wage to human capital and low level of education technology no longer 
play a role in determining schooling of the child. 
 
 
4. Long run Dynamics 
 
4.1 Dynamics of schooling when parents work in the unskilled sector 
 
Putting st=	s= s∗in the expression of st we get 
[b (Aφ + ρ+ bh ]	s∗2 + b [(Aφ + ρ - A(1+φ)+	h-pc}]s∗ + h 	Aφ + ρ = 0 
This implies that if b[Aφ + ρ - A (1+φ) +	h-pc}] <0 i.e. if A + h >  +pc , then only we 
get two positive values of	s∗, otherwise we do not get any positive value of s∗. 
 
The dynamics of s is shown in the following diagram: 
         
Figure 1: Dynamics of schooling 
capital accumulation                                                        
 
We demonstrate here the case where N is a fraction. So 
beyond N, s is falling. There are two steady state equilibria. The low level steady state s*
is unstable and represents a low level equilibrium trap. If s
on falling till becomes zero. Beyond s*
the time path becomes convergent and oscillating.  s*
equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 7: In case of unskilled parent
is sufficiently high to cover education cost and subsistence expenditure. Steady state 
equilibrium, if it exists, is not unique. T
parental level of schooling is below a critical level(s*
level equilibrium trap. Beyond that critical level the time path of schooling of the child is 
convergent towards high level equilibrium (s*
convergent but oscillating in nature.
 
In this paper we are obtaining fluctuations in 
altruism by more educated parents and learning by doing effect in unskilled wage.
 
 
4.2 Dynamics of human capital
 
In this section we discuss dynamics of human capital for the dynasties of which pa
in unskilled sector. Since human capital accumulation function is given by 
1 implies that ht= ht+1 i.e. when schooling is at steady state (s
for unskilled sector when intercept term exists in
 
s is rising till N is reached and 
t-1 is below s*
low   schooling keeps on increasing. Once N is crossed, 
high  represents the high level 
, steady state of schooling exists if unskilled wage 
here exist two steady states of schooling
low), the economy gets trapped in a low 
high).Beyond s*high the time path of schooling is 
 
schooling because of the assumptions of higher 
 when parents work in the unskilled sector
t= st-1=  s∗) human capital will 
       
 human 
low 
low schooling keeps 
. When 
  
 
rents work 
ht = bst-1+ h. st= st-
also be in steady state (ht= ht+1
schooling- first convergent and then oscillating and 
capital is constant. The comparative static results which hold true for steady state schooling 
will hold true for steady state human capital as well. Therefore  
same signs as "
∗
"	, "
∗
"  and  
"
"
where	h = 0	in the above model.
 
 
4.3 Dynamics of schooling when parents work in the skilled sector
 
Putting st=	s= s∗in the expression of s
[b (δ − Aφ − ρ]	s∗2 + b [δh −
We assume δ > Aφ + ρ and δ
 
The dynamics of st is shown in the following diagram:
 
 
 
Figure 2: Dynamics of schooling 
capital accumulation                                               
 
In Figure 2 we illustrate the case where R is a fraction. So 
beyond R, s is rising. There is one steady state equilibrium given by s*. If s
= h∗). The time path of human capital will be similar to that of 
convergent. Here growth rate of human 
"∗
" 	, "
∗
"∗
 . We have made the comparative static analysis for the case 
 
 
t we get pc − ρ]s∗ - h 	Aφ + ρ = 0 
h > pc + ρ to get one positive value of s∗ 
 
for skilled sector when intercept term exists in human 
 
s is falling till R is reached and 
 and  "
∗
"  will have 
 
t-1 is below s* 
schooling keeps on falling till becomes zero. Above s* schooling keeps on increasing till it 
converges to full schooling. 
 
Proposition 8: In case of skilled parent, one steady state of schooling exists, which is 
unstable in nature. When parental level of schooling is below a critical level(s*), schooling 
keeps on falling till it becomes zero. Beyond that critical level schooling keeps on increasing 
till it converges to full schooling. 
 
If it is assumed that parental schooling must be at least s* for being employed as skilled 
labour then for skilled parent child schooling always converges to unity. 
 
4.4 Dynamics of human capital when parents work in the skilled sector 
 
In this section we discuss dynamics of human capital for the skilled parent. Since human 
capital accumulation function is given by ht = bst-1+ h. st= st-1 implies that ht= ht+1 i.e. when 
schooling is at steady state (st= st-1=  s∗) human capital will also be in steady state (ht= ht+1= h∗). The time path of human capital will be similar to that of schooling- divergent in nature. 
Here growth rate of human capital is constant. 
 
 
5. Case when ? = @	 in the above model-No intercept term in human capital 
accumulation function 
 
In this case we assume that human capital formation of child depends only on schooling of 
the child and not on minimum level of human capital possessed by the child even if she does 
not attend school. Under this special case, human capital accumulation function is given as 
follows: 
ht+1 = bst 
 
5.1 Parents working in unskilled sector 
 
From the optimization problem of unskilled parent we get7 
 
st  = 	
				  
 
Differentiating st with respect to s we get 
 
"
"	 = 
								
			#  
 
"
"	 >0 if [-hs - 2sh + {A (1+φ + h-pc}	> 0 
 
or  s < ± &'	()* + 2 − .* 	 -1=M 
 
                                                           
7
 For detailed derivations please see Appendix (B.2) and (B.4) of Appendix B. 
 
We ignore the negative term since s cannot be negative. 
 
"#
"	#  = 
[	#{							}]	
		1	  
"#
"	#  <0 if 	h1 + s + A	1 + φ + 1 − 	sh − pc − h	s1 + 	s >0 
or A(1+φ) + 2h - pc>0 
"#
"	#  >0 if A (1+φ) + 2h - pc <0 
We assume A(1+φ) + 2h - pc>0 otherwise &'	()* + 2 − .* 	 becomes an imaginary number. 
If M≥1, s is always less than M. This implies that when M≥1 ""	 >0 always. 
Now M≥1 implies   ≥ 2. 
The above condition will hold true if A1 + φ − pc  >0, A (1+φ) is high and h is low. 
 
Thus Proposition 3 holds true here as well. 
 
If M<0, then this condition is never satisfied. Equilibrium does not exist. 
Therefore if M is a fraction, then  ""	 >0 till M is reached and thereafter 
"
"	 <0. 
Now M is a fraction when 0<M<1. This implies -1<  <2. 
If A1 + φ > pc  but A (1+φ) is low and h  is high then this inequality is likely to be 
satisfied. 
"#
"	#  <0 throughout. 
 
When human capital formation of child depends only on time devoted for her own schooling 
then also if total earnings of the household exceed subsistence consumption expenditure but 
are low and learning by doing effect is high, then below a particular level of parental 
schooling there is positive relationship between parental schooling and schooling of the child. 
But beyond a certain level of parental schooling, schooling of the child decreases with 
increase in parental level of schooling. So even in this special case we observe that 
proposition 4 holds good. 
 
 
5.2 Parents working in skilled sector 
 
From the optimization problem of skilled parent we get 
 
st  = 	
6			  
Differentiating st with respect to s we get 
"
"	 = 
6	# 	6	
			#  
"
"		 > 0 if δbs + 	2δbs + Aφ − pc  > 0. 
or s > ± &.:, −	6 + 1-1 =K 
If K≤ 0 this condition is always satisfied. So for K≤ 0 ""		 > 0 always. 
If K≥ 1, this condition is never satisfied. 
If 0<K<1, then ""	 < 0 till K is reached and beyond K 
"
"	 > 0. 
 
5.3 Dynamics of schooling and human capital 
 
Let us denote the steady state schooling in unskilled sector as 
 
sA∗= 	  
sA∗= 0 if A +	h	≤ pc + ρ 
sA∗= 1 if A-	Aφ-pc-h	 ≥ 2ρ 
The steady state schooling in skilled sector is given as 
s∗= 6 
s∗ >0 if δb − Aφ − ρ >0 
The dynamics of s in both unskilled and skilled sectors are shown in the following diagram 
Figure 3: Dynamics of schooling for both skilled and unskilled sectors
intercept term in human capital accumulation
                                                                              
In Figure 3 we demonstrate that case of
unskilled parent, till M is reached, time path of 
time path becomes convergent and oscillating. The low level equilibrium trap vanishes and 
there is only one steady state level of schooling
equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 9: In case of unskilled parent
human capital possessed by the 
term in human capital accumulation
is steadily convergent in nature
schooling su* and beyond that 
nature. The low level equilibrium trap does not exist anymore.
 
So, for unskilled parent we notice that the intercept term in human capital 
function is responsible for creating a trap in schooling.
 
st for skilled parent - st-1 for skilled parent
crosses s∗, st will be greater than
sector. 
 
The incentive compatibility condition implies w
schooling exceeds this particular level
 
Now st for skilled parent at s = 
will be continuous at st = s. 
 
 when there is no 
    
 
 unskilled parent where M is a fraction. 
s is convergent but once M is crossed, the 
 in the case of unskilled parent.
 (parental skill below	s), when minimum level of 
child if she does not attend school is zero
 function is absent, the time path of schooling of the child 
 when approached from below steady state level of parental 
su*, the time path of schooling is convergent but oscillating in 
 
 
 > 0 if st-1> 

6 =s∗. This implies that once 
 st-1 i.e. st curve will lie above the 450 line in case of skilled 
t+1> A+(1- st)h  i.e. st > s = 
 individuals join the skilled sector. 
st in case of unskilled parent at s.This implies that the 
 
In case of 
 sA∗  is a stable 
 or the intercept 
accumulation 
st 
	
6	 . Only when 
st curve 
If 6 > 
	
6	 then s∗ > s > sA∗8 
In our model we assume 6 >	 	6	 . Therefore s∗ > s > sA∗  
 
In skilled sector, st (at st-1 = 	s - s	= [	6]  
Since we assume in our paper 6 >	 	6	 , therefore [st in skilled sector (at st-1 = s-s	 ] 
<0. This implies that st at s lies below the 450 line in skilled sector. 
 
When the parental level of schooling lies between sA∗  and	s, schooling of child keeps on 
falling till it converges to the unskilled level steady state schooling su* in an oscillating 
manner.  
 
In Figure 3 we consider that case of skilled parent where K is fraction and s < K. In this case 
we consider the situation when even skilled parent may send their child for partial schooling. 
Here, for skilled sector st curve with respect to s t-1 is falling till K is reached and beyond K, st 
curve in skilled sector is rising. Note that s∗ denotes an unstable equilibrium for the parents 
working in skilled sector. Below 	s∗,  st in skilled sector keeps on falling and eventually 
converges to steady state equilibrium in unskilled sector in an oscillating manner. Beyond s∗ 
schooling of child keeps on increasing and will eventually converge to st=1.Hence the 
dynasties having parental skill level between s and ss *may end up in the situation where next 
generations will be working as unskilled labour. Lower is	s∗, lower is the parental level of 
human capital required to launch the economy on the path of steady growth of schooling. 
Lower s∗ is thus good for the economy. Increase in education cost (ρ), child wage (Aφ) and 
subsistence consumption expenditure (pc ) thus leads to higher s∗ which is not good for the 
economy. Increase in responsiveness of wage to human capital (δ) and improvement in 
education technology (rise in b) lead to lower s∗ which is good for the economy. 
 
If s > K then st in skilled sector will be rising throughout. 
 
Proposition 10: In case of skilled parent there exists a critical level of parental schooling 
beyond which steady growth of schooling of child takes place. However there exists a certain 
range of parental human capital for which schooling of child keeps on falling till it converges 
to the unskilled level steady state schooling in an oscillating manner. 
 
Now in skilled sector st =
	
6			
()(	)
  
st >0 if δbs  + s(	φA − pc )	 >0 . Thus (	φA − pc )	 > 0 is sufficient condition for st 
>0. 
st = 1 if δbs −(pc	+ρ) s − (	Aφ + ρ)	 ≥ 0 
This implies that there exists one positive value of s say s9 for which st = 1.  
If s> s9  then all parents who are employed in skilled sector send their children for full 
schooling. 
                                                           
8
 For detailed derivation please see Appendix B 
 The dynamics of schooling for this case is shown in the following diagram:
Figure 4: Dynamics of schooling for skilled sector 
capital accumulation and when 
 
In case of unskilled parent, till M is reached, time path of  
crossed, the time path becomes convergent and oscillating.
level of schooling in the case of unskilled parent 
who work in skilled sector always send thei
schooling in skilled sector i.e. 
 
So in this paper we are getting low level equilibrium trap
human capital acquired by their children 
in other words if there exists an intercept term in human capital accumulation function. On 
the other hand, if there does not exist any intercept term in human capital accumulation 
function, for skilled parent if s
children for partial schooling
schooling beyond which steady growth of schooling of child takes place and eventually it 
converges towards full schooling. However below that critical level, schooling of child keeps 
on falling till it converges to the unskilled level steady state schooling in an oscillating 
manner. In the long run after few dynasties their grand
unskilled labour. 
 
Note that in the case where parents work in unskilled sector the following hold true
 
                                                          
9
 For detailed derivation please see equations (B.6), (B.7) and (B.8) of Appendix
 
in absence of intercept term in human 
s> s9 
s is convergent but once M is 
 There is only one steady state 
sA
∗
 which is a stable equilibrium. 
r children for full schooling.
s
∗
 = 1. 
 for unskilled parent when level of 
is positive even if they do not attend school at all or 
<s9 this implies that even if being skilled parents 
 then in this case there exists a critical level of parental 
children may end up worki
 B. 
 
 
Parents 
 Steady state 
they send their 
ng as 
9: 
	i)	"C
∗
"
	< 0 if A+h>ρ + pcc . This implies that if the maximum possible adult unskilled wage 
exceeds the sum of the schooling cost and subsistence expenditure of the household, steady 
state schooling of child of unskilled parent increases with fall in child wage. Thus due to 
child labour ban, when child wage falls, steady state schooling increases when parents work 
in unskilled sector. 
 
iii) "C
∗
" 	< 0. This implies that with fall in schooling cost steady state schooling in unskilled 
sector increases. So an education subsidy is going to increase steady state schooling of the 
child. 
 
iv) "C∗
"
 >0 .This implies that with increase in unskilled adult wage, steady state schooling will 
increase. 
 
Proposition 11: Steady state schooling of child of unskilled parent increases with increase in 
adult unskilled wage but decreases with increase in education cost. It increases with fall in 
child wage only if the maximum possible adult unskilled wage exceeds the sum of the 
schooling cost and subsistence expenditure of the household.  
 
When schooling will be in steady state, human capital will also be in steady state and 
dynamics of human capital is same as dynamics of schooling in this case too. 
 
 
5.4 Comparison between the effects of ban and subsidy 
 
In this section we compare the effects of ban and education subsidy on steady state schooling 
in the case where parents work in the unskilled sector. 
|"∗
"
|-|"∗
"
| 
=  
()	()EF	()	
EF#
 
If 1<A<pc <2, then the above expression is positive. 
 
Again if pc <A<1 then also the above expression is positive. 
 
This implies that if adult unskilled wage is less than subsistence consumption expenditure or 
even if adult unskilled wage exceeds subsistence expenditure but is less than one, the effect 
of giving education subsidy is higher than child labour ban in enhancing schooling. 
 
Proposition 12: If adult unskilled wage is less than subsistence consumption expenditure or 
even if adult unskilled wage exceeds subsistence expenditure but is sufficiently small, the 
effect of giving education subsidy is higher than child labour ban in enhancing schooling. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Child labour continues to remain a social evil in developing countries. The present paper 
addresses the issue of child labour in the presence of learning by doing effect on unskilled 
wage.  
 
This paper builds an overlapping generations model of household economy consisting of a 
skilled sector and an unskilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she gets 
wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector wage includes a positive 
learning by doing effect generated from working in her childhood along with a fixed return. 
Human capital formation of the child is included in the parental utility function and parental 
choice of schooling vis-a-vis child work is considered. We consider two cases-firstly we 
consider the case where human capital accumulation of the child depends on time devoted to 
schooling by the child and minimum level of human capital possessed by the child even if she 
does not attend school and next we consider the case where human capital accumulation of 
the child depends only on minimum level of human capital possessed by the child even if she 
does not attend school. 
 
When human capital accumulation of the child depends on time devoted to schooling by the 
child and minimum level of human capital possessed by the child even if she does not attend 
school we find that there exists two steady state equilibria of schooling for  unskilled parent. 
The low level equilibrium represents a trap. Once the trap is crossed schooling keeps on 
increasing and the time path of schooling is convergent towards the higher of the equilibrium. 
Once higher equilibrium is crossed time path of schooling becomes convergent but oscillating 
in nature. When human capital of child depends only on schooling of child and there is no 
intercept term in human capital accumulation function, the trap ceases to exist. 
 
When human capital accumulation of the child depends on time devoted to schooling by the 
child and minimum level of human capital possessed by the child even if she does not attend 
school we find that one steady state equilibrium exists which is unstable in nature. Below the 
steady state schooling keeps on falling till it becomes zero. Beyond the steady state, 
schooling keeps on increasing till it converges to full schooling. When human capital of child 
depends only on schooling of child and there is no intercept term in human capital 
accumulation function, if schooling required to be engaged as skilled worker is higher than 
the critical level of parental schooling beyond which they send their children for full 
schooling then there exists only one steady state equilibrium in case of skilled parent and that 
is full schooling. But if skilled parents also send their children for partial schooling then there 
exists a critical level of parental schooling beyond which steady growth of schooling of child 
takes place and eventually it converges towards full schooling. However below that critical 
level, schooling of child keeps on falling till it converges to the unskilled level steady state 
schooling in an oscillating manner. 
 
This paper attempts to understand the effects of child labour ban and education subsidy on 
steady state schooling of child labour in such a situation. Moreover this paper studies the 
relative effectiveness of child labour ban and education subsidy in improving schooling of the 
child in such a situation. When human capital formation of child depends only on schooling 
of the child, we find that in case of unskilled parent, as child wage falls, steady state 
schooling and steady state human capital increase only if the unskilled adult wage exceeds 
the sum of subsistence consumption expenditure and schooling cost of the household. A fall 
in schooling cost increases the steady state schooling and steady state human capital for 
unskilled parent. Comparing the effects of ban and education subsidy on steady state human 
capital in case of unskilled parent, we get the result that if unskilled adult is sufficiently 
small, the effect of giving education subsidy is more effective in enhancing schooling than 
banning child labour. 
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                                                    Appendix A- General Model 
In case of unskilled parent, the optimization problem is 
Max Ut = ln (ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst +h	) 
subject to [A+ (1- st-1)h ]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pc ct +ρ st , 
                 ct≥c 
        and 0≤ st, st-1 ≤1 
with respect to the decision variables of the household, viz, ct and st. 
 
In case of unskilled parent, the Lagrangian function is 
Z= 
 
ln(ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst+h) +λ  [{A+ (1- st-1)h }+ Aφ (1-st )- pcct -ρ st ] +θ(ct -c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
.
The first order conditions for maximization of utility are 
given by:  
 6G
6
 =   - λpc + θ = 0                                                                                                         (A.1)  
 
6G
6
 = 
	

 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                                                                   (A.2)  
 θ ≥ 0, θ (ct -c) = 0                                   (A.3)
   
From (A.1) and budget constraint [A+ (1- st-1)h ]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,we get 

 ( 	)   ( )   
   = λ                                                                                  (A.4)                                          
From (A.2) and (A.4) we get, 
st =      
	
(	)  ( ) 
()(	)
                                                                         (A.5)  
 
In case of skilled parent, the optimization problem is 
Max Ut = ln (ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst +h ) 
subject to [(δbst-1+ δh ]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pc ct +ρ st , 
                 ct≥c 
        and 0≤ st, st-1 ≤1 
with respect to the decision variables of the household, viz, ct and st. 
 
In case of skilled parent, the Lagrangian function is 
Z= 
 
ln(ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst+h) +λ  [δ bst-1+ δh+ Aφ (1-st )- pcct -ρ st ] +θ(ct -c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
.
The first order conditions for maximization of utility are 
given by:  
 
6G
6
 =   - λpc + θ = 0                                                                                                         (A.6)  
 
6G
6
 = 
	

 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                                                                   (A.7)  
 θ ≥ 0, θ (ct -c) = 0                                   (A.8)
   
From (A.6) and budget constraint δ bst-1+ δh+ Aφ (1-st )+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,we get 

6 	 6   ( )   
   = λ                                                                                     (A.9)                                         
From (A.7) and (A.9) we get, 
st =      
	76 	 6 8 ( ) 
()(	)
                                                                          (A.10)    
 
  
                                     Appendix B: Case where ? =0  
 
In case of unskilled parent the Lagrangian function is  
Z= 
 
ln(ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst) +λ  [{A+ (1- st-1)h }+ Aφ (1-st )- pcct -ρ st ] +θ(ct -c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The 
first order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
 
6G
6
 =   - λpc + θ = 0                                                                                                        (B.1) 
6G
 6
 = 
	

 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                                                                     (B.2)  
 θ ≥ 0, θ (ct -c) = 0                                   (B.3)
        
From (B.1) and budget constraint [A+ (1- st-1)h ]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,we get 

 ( 	)   ( ) 
   = λ                                                                                  (B.4)                                                                                        
From (B.2) and (B.4) we get, 
st =      
	
(	)  
()(	)
                                                                                           (B.5)                
"C∗
"  =   
[]
EF#
                                                                                                           (B.6)  
"C∗
"   =   
[()]
EF#                                                                                                                                                            
(B.7)
  
 
"C∗
"  =  
()
EF#  
 
           
                                                                                        
       
(B.8)  
 
In case of skilled parent the Lagrangian function is Z= 
 
ln(ct -c) + st-1 ln (bst) +λ  [δbst-1+Aφ 
(1-st )- pcct -ρ st ] +θ(ct -c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The 
first order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
 
6G
6
 =   - λpc + θ = 0                                                                                                        (B.9) 
6G
 6
 = 
	

 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                                                                    (B.10)  
 θ ≥ 0, θ (ct -c) = 0                                  (B.11)
        
From (B.9) and budget constraint δbst-1+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,we get 

6 	   ( )   
   = λ                                                                                          (B.12)                                                                                           
From (B.10) and (B.12) we get, 
st =  
	
6	  
()(	)
  
 
                                                                                                  (B.13)  
 
Relation betweenHI∗ , H  and HH∗ 
sA∗ =    
s =  6  
s∗= 6 
s∗ > s if 6 > 
 
6  
 
sA∗  < s if E F
(6) (6 )()
E6 F()  <0 
 
Now if 6 >  
 
6  , then sA
∗
 < s 
 
Therefore if 6 > 
 
6  then s
∗
 > s > sA∗  
